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Abstract 
The European Commission will strongly cap state aid to airports from 2024, putting at risk many smaller airports failing to break 
even. Based on literature research and empirical cases, we assess public funding options to increase traffic and revenues of 
airports which are unlikely to infringe state aid rules. There is some scope to declare several airport functions as areas of non-
economic nature, which would allow public bodies to take over costs without violating European state aid rules. In addition, 
boosting the number of air services operated as public service obligations and providing incentives may constitute legitimate 
options to improve airport financials. However, all forms of support described herein come at the taxpayers’ expense, though. 
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1. Introduction 
The decentralized European airport landscape is characterized by an uneven distribution of flights (Suau-Sanchez, 
2013). Larger airports are usually profitable, while smaller ones are highly challenged to recover even operational 
costs, not to mention full costs including investments, financing or depreciation (ACI Europe, 2016). Several factors 
contribute to the low profitability of small airports: Many regional airports are located outside large metropolitan 
areas where passenger potentials and hence the attractiveness for carriers may be limited. Low traffic levels then 
hamper cost recovery, as many positions of airport costs are fixed (see Fernandes et al., 2014 or Vogel, 2016). Apart 
from this cost burden, only a few low cost carriers (LCC) operate in general at smaller airports. The aim of the LCCs 
is to reduce costs, especially the cost of using airports, avoid complexity and exploit benefits (Warnock-Smith and 
Potter, 2005).  
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In addition, small airports are faced to a phenomenon called ―route churn‖: major LCCs operate as pan-European 
carriers without being closely attached to a national home market, and rely to a large extent on outsourcing. This 
minimizes irreversible investments in particular airport bases and reduces switching costs (de Wit and Zuidberg, 
2016).Thus, while LCCs  dictate prices (Zuidberg, 2017), airports and their (usually public) owners can either lower 
airport charges, introduce inventive payments to attract LCC and boost passenger throughput, or maintain their old 
charging schemes and see passenger numbers decline. In these cases, operational losses and a need for state support 
are likely results (Kazda et al., 2017). 
 
While the European Commission (EC) acknowledges that there might be a need for state intervention on airports 
with less than 3 million passengers (EC, 2014b), in several cases, the EC declared state aid to airlines or airports to 
be incompatible with the law (see EC, 2014a). This is making it difficult for airports providing an incentive for 
carriers. Moreover, smaller airports are facing an uncertain future as, by 2024, the ―Guidelines on State aid to 
airports and airlines‖ (EC, 2014b) is supposed to put stronger limitations on public finance of airports with more 
than 200,000 passengers. The tightening of the Guidelines may lead to far-reaching consequences for airports that 
will not be able to cover their operational costs by that deadline (Zuidberg, 2017). In summary, several regional 
airports might be forced to cease operations after 2024. 
2. Objective, Methodology and Research Contribution 
Connectivity provided by air transport supply is one important pillar for regional development (see in general e.g. 
Brueckner, 2003, or Green, 2007, and on Europe van de Vijver et al. 2016, Florida et al., 2015 and Tveter, 2017). 
Therefore, a large-scale closure of regional airports could contradict goals of regional development and cohesion. In 
addition, closing airports seems to be unlikely in an environment where policy officers declare airports as ―job 
machines‖, as it is considered that one job in the air transport industry creates more than three jobs in other sectors 
(Lenne, 2018). 
 
This paper aims to identify feasible ways for airport management and (regional) governments to cope with the 
legal framework. The results may be of interest both for airport managers and owners and for policymakers: The 
former might be interested in learning how to deal with new state aid rules, and how to circumvent them, while the 
latter would aim to close exactly any existing loopholes, as the identified options could be regarded as detrimental to 
the EC’s goal to safeguard competition.  
 
The methodology of the paper is a qualitative literature- and case study-based assessment of the relevant legal 
framework. The study provides a description on the barriers and possibilities on continuing public funding of 
Community airport and airline operations under the Guidelines set by the European Commission (2014b).  
 
In the following section (3), the paper briefly assesses the outcome of the prominent court case on Charleroi 
Airport as an example of how the EC dealt with state aid to airports in the past. As a solution and consequence of 
previous controversial regulatory steps, the new Guidelines (EC, 2014b) came into force in 2014. The authors 
summarize key criteria of state aid rules, which form the basis for subsequent assessments. Based on cases from the 
literature, section 4 discusses potential ways to improve financials and/or traffic volumes at smaller airports under 
the Guidelines. This section contains a legal compatibility analysis of (1) subsidies for airport activities of non-
economic nature, (2) application of public service obligations (PSO) and (3) the provision of incentive schemes to 
air operators. Section 5 concludes the findings on possible options to support regional airports and stimulate traffic 
against the background of strict EU state aid rules for airlines and airports from an applied perspective and further 
discusses some limitations of the paper and resulting needs for future research. In sum, the paper complements the 
vast literature on specific issues regarding state aid to airports and airlines, and can therefore serve as a basis for 
more in-detailed legal and economic assessments for the future of regional airports. 
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are likely results (Kazda et al., 2017). 
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will not be able to cover their operational costs by that deadline (Zuidberg, 2017). In summary, several regional 
airports might be forced to cease operations after 2024. 
2. Objective, Methodology and Research Contribution 
Connectivity provided by air transport supply is one important pillar for regional development (see in general e.g. 
Brueckner, 2003, or Green, 2007, and on Europe van de Vijver et al. 2016, Florida et al., 2015 and Tveter, 2017). 
Therefore, a large-scale closure of regional airports could contradict goals of regional development and cohesion. In 
addition, closing airports seems to be unlikely in an environment where policy officers declare airports as ―job 
machines‖, as it is considered that one job in the air transport industry creates more than three jobs in other sectors 
(Lenne, 2018). 
 
This paper aims to identify feasible ways for airport management and (regional) governments to cope with the 
legal framework. The results may be of interest both for airport managers and owners and for policymakers: The 
former might be interested in learning how to deal with new state aid rules, and how to circumvent them, while the 
latter would aim to close exactly any existing loopholes, as the identified options could be regarded as detrimental to 
the EC’s goal to safeguard competition.  
 
The methodology of the paper is a qualitative literature- and case study-based assessment of the relevant legal 
framework. The study provides a description on the barriers and possibilities on continuing public funding of 
Community airport and airline operations under the Guidelines set by the European Commission (2014b).  
 
In the following section (3), the paper briefly assesses the outcome of the prominent court case on Charleroi 
Airport as an example of how the EC dealt with state aid to airports in the past. As a solution and consequence of 
previous controversial regulatory steps, the new Guidelines (EC, 2014b) came into force in 2014. The authors 
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the Guidelines. This section contains a legal compatibility analysis of (1) subsidies for airport activities of non-
economic nature, (2) application of public service obligations (PSO) and (3) the provision of incentive schemes to 
air operators. Section 5 concludes the findings on possible options to support regional airports and stimulate traffic 
against the background of strict EU state aid rules for airlines and airports from an applied perspective and further 
discusses some limitations of the paper and resulting needs for future research. In sum, the paper complements the 
vast literature on specific issues regarding state aid to airports and airlines, and can therefore serve as a basis for 
more in-detailed legal and economic assessments for the future of regional airports. 
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3. EC Guidelines on state aid to airports and airlines 
At the beginning of the 21th century, the European Commission brought forward controversial cases to the 
European Court of Justice concerning the legal evaluation on state aid in the context of airports and airlines. 
Probably the most disputed one is the Charleroi Airport and Ryanair case (C76/2002), which had engaged the EC 
and the Court for over 13 years, before the latest decision (that the measures granted did not constitute state aid) was 
made in October 2014. The Belgian press published in July 2001 that Ryanair received state aid from Wallonie for 
its operations at Charleroi Airport. The EC opened the official investigation in December 2002. It took more than 
one additional year that a (partly) negative decision was adopted by the EC in February 2004. Through, following 
almost 5 years of discussion, this decision was annulled by the General Court in December 2008 saying that the 
―Commission’s decision (…) was vitiated by an error in law‖ (EC, 2016, p.64). This case showed that it was time to 
amend the law (more on the case see e.g. in Barbot, 2006 and in Griffin, 2006). 
 
Taking into account the market developments, the EC amended the previous state aid framework (EC, 2005) and 
published a new ―Guidelines on state aid for airports and airlines‖ (EC, 2014b). The preamble of the Guidelines 
argues that the EC is aware of a multitude of complex long-term arrangements between airports, airlines and public 
authorities, where state aid may distort competition and may undermine the level playing field in the market, while 
on the other hand, well-founded arguments for state aid exist that could help to correct market failures.  
 
The following section describes the main criteria on state aid in the new Guidelines (EC, 2014b), which is also 
summarized in the below figure. 
 
Criteria Investment aid to 
airports 
Operating aid to airports Start-up aid to airlines 
a) Contribution to a well-
defined objective of 
common interest 
Increasing intra-EU mobility; 
Facilitating regional development 
No duplication of existing 
comparable connection (high-speed 
rail, another airport) 
b) Need for state 
intervention 
Airports with less than 3 million annual passengers (pax) 
(help to larger airports only in case of case-specific or exceptional circumstances) 
 10 years transitional period Airports in remote regions 
c) Appropriateness of the 
aid measure Address the common interest  
 Less distortive  
(guarantees, soft loans) 
Fixed sum  covering the 
expected gap 
Ex ante business plan showing 
profitability at least after 3 years 
d) Incentive effect 
Analysis based on ex ante  
business plan 
Present,  if the level of 
economic activity of the 
airport would be 
significantly reduced in its 
absence 
If the new route would not have 
been launched without aid; start 
new route after submitting the 
application form for aid! 
e) Proportionality of the 
aid Up to 25% (3m - 5m pax) 
Up to 50% (1m – 3m pax) 
Up to 75% (below 1m 
pax) 
Up to 50% (700.000 - 3m 
pax) 
Up to 80% (less than 
700.000 pax) 
Up to 100% (below 200.000 
pax)* 
50% of airport charges for max. 3 
years 
f) Avoidance of undue 
negative effects on 
competition and trade 
Airports with traffic up to 
5 million pax; resulting 
from business plan 
Assessment 
Public authorities must make plans 
public; no accumulation with other 
state aid on the route 
*) A revised EU Block Exemption Regulation from 2017 now also covers airports <200,000 pax (EC, 2017b). 
Figure 1: The criteria framework on state aid to airports and airlines, Source: own figure based on EC (2014b) and EC (2017b) 
 
Except for very case-specific or exceptional circumstances, investment and operating aid may only be granted to 
airports with less than 3 million passengers per year, which however applies to more than 85% of all airports in 
Europe (Fig. 2). State aid for investment in airport infrastructure may be allowed if there is a genuine transport need 
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and the public support is necessary to ensure the accessibility of a region. The new guidelines define maximum 
permissible aid intensities depending on the size of an airport, in order to ensure the right mix between public and 
private investment. The possibilities to grant aid are therefore higher for smaller airports than for larger ones.  
 
Operating aid to regional airports is allowed for a transitional period of 10 years, in order to give airports time to 
adjust their business model. In order to receive operating aid, airports need to work out a business plan towards full 
coverage of operating costs at the end of the transitional period. The Guidelines then allow for higher investment 
and operating aid intensities for airports with annual passenger traffic below 700,000 and 200,000 passengers, 
respectively, with the latter group being exempted from most state-aid restrictions. 
 
Start-up aid to airlines is defined as a ―necessary incentive to create new routes from regional airports‖ and may 
amount to up to 50% of airport charges over a maximum of three years. Even if the aid intensity remains under this 
threshold, start-up aid offered by the airport operator can be an issue under the regime of the new Guidelines. This is 
because the provision of start-up aid ceteris paribus may result in lower net revenues and hence – given the high 
share of fixed costs at the airport level (Maertens, 2013) – in higher losses at the airport operator level, which in turn 
may increase the airport’s need for operating aid.  
Fig. 2. Number and share of EU airports by size group, Source: Sabre MI 
Table 1 further provides information on the geographic distribution of airports in the EU by size class. France has 
the highest number of airports under 200,000 passengers per year (37), followed by Greece and Sweden with 28 
airports each. The United Kingdom has 27 small airports, Spain 14 and Germany and Italy 10 each.  
 
Airports between 200,000 and 3 million passengers are potentially most severely affected by the current 
regulation on state aid, as the European law prohibits operational aid being paid after the 10-year transitional period. 
Spain and Italy have 18 airports in this size class each, followed by United Kingdom with 17, Germany with 15 and 
France with 14. Interestingly, all EU Member States with the exception of Hungary and Belgium have at least one 
airport with 200,000 to 3 million passengers per year, so the issue discussed in this paper is of EU-wide relevance.  
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France with 14. Interestingly, all EU Member States with the exception of Hungary and Belgium have at least one 
airport with 200,000 to 3 million passengers per year, so the issue discussed in this paper is of EU-wide relevance.  
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     Table 1. Number of airports by passengers in the EU 2017 (Source: Sabre MI) 
EU Member State No. of airports  
< 200,000 
passengers per 
year 
No. of airports  
> 200,000 and  
< 3,000,000 
passengers per 
year 
No. of airports  
> 3,000,000 
passengers per 
year 
Total number of 
airports with 
scheduled services 
in 2017 
France 37 14 7 58 
United Kingdom 27 17 9 53 
Spain 14 18 10 42 
Greece 28 10 1 39 
Sweden 28 8 2 38 
Italy 10 18 8 36 
Germany 10 15 8 33 
Portugal 13 3 3 19 
Finland 14 2 1 17 
Poland 5 9 1 15 
Romania 4 6 1 11 
Denmark 5 2 1 8 
Croatia 3 5 0 8 
Ireland 2 3 1 6 
Austria 2 3 1 6 
Czech Republic 4 1 1 6 
Netherlands 2 2 1 5 
Belgium 3 0 2 5 
Bulgaria 1 2 1 4 
Cyprus 0 2 1 3 
Lithuania 1 2 0 3 
Slovakia 1 2 0 3 
Hungary 1 0 1 2 
Estonia 1 1 0 2 
Latvia 1 1 0 2 
Malta 0 1 0 1 
Luxembourg 0 1 0 1 
Slovenia 0 1 0 1 
EU-28 Total (2017) 217 149 61 427 
 
4. Possibilities for public support to regional airports and airlines  
The Guidelines follow the aim to prohibit anti-competitive state aid. However, there are many ways of dealing 
with the state aid issues, which are against the EC’s idea of safeguarding competition. The following three 
subchapters characterize opportunities to bypass state aid rules: subsidies of activities of non-economic nature, 
(increasing) application of public service obligations (PSOs) and state-funded incentive schemes. 
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4.1. Subsidy of non-economic activities  
The Guidelines explicitly define areas which do not fall under the state aid regulations allowing government 
bodies take over the costs from an airport operator, i.e. air traffic control, police, customs, firefighting, safety 
activities against unlawful interference, and the concerning investments into infrastructure and equipment (EC, 
2014b). The EC is aware that this exception has the potential to distort competition in the European Union (EU): 
 
―Public financing of non-economic activities must not lead to undue discrimination between airports. Indeed, it is 
established case law that there is an advantage when public authorities relieve undertakings of the costs inherent to 
their economic activities (40). Therefore, when it is normal under a given legal order that civil airports have to bear 
certain costs inherent to their operation, whereas other civil airports do not, the latter might be granted an 
advantage, regardless of whether or not those costs relate to an activity which in general is considered to be of a 
non-economic nature‖ (EC, 2014a).  
 
Regional airports in Germany for instance have to cover the above mentioned costs on their own, or – 
respectively – charge airlines or passengers for the use of these services. The latter is not always possible given the 
market power of LCCs. Hence, airports located in countries that publicly provide these services have an advantage 
over airports located in countries that do not cover these costs by the public. As an example, a study conducted on 
behalf of the EC found in 2004 that security screening costs at regional airports located in Belgium and Greece are 
exclusively paid for by the state. The same applies for all airports in Luxembourg and Switzerland (Irish Aviation 
Authority / aviasolutions, 2004). 
 
In summary, public authorities may partially or even fully take over the costs for terminal air traffic management, 
firefighting and security and hence relieving the airport operator from a fixed cost block which is difficult to cover 
from operational revenues.   
4.2. Application of Public Service Obligations 
Public Service Obligations (PSOs) in air transport are part of the EU’s legislation for Services of General 
Economic Interest (SGEI). With this instrument it shall be safeguarded that any services, which are not 
commercially viable but still considered by the Member States to be in the general economic interest, can be 
provided under the condition that the State provides financial support (―compensation‖). The SGEI Package (EC, 
2012) and the Articles 16 to 18 of the Air Services Regulation 1008/2008 (EC, 2008) describe the conditions for 
allowing an air route as PSO: 
 
a) The task for a SGEI must be imposed by a public authority 
b) The SGEI must encompass a single route or a group of routes to be defined ex ante (no generic route or 
any route from an airport or city) 
c) SGEI should exhibit "special characteristics, as compared with ordinary economic activities‖  
d) SGEI must fulfil transport needs which cannot be met by existing air routes or other means of transport 
e) Access to a route can be limited for a time of up to four years 
f) An invitation to tender containing objective and transparent parameters concerning the compensation 
payment has to be published 
 
The original intention of the legislator for the application of PSOs was to enable Member States (or regional 
authorities) to finance air services on routes which are not commercially viable, but are deemed necessary to keep 
up a minimum level of quality of life in sparsely populated, outermost, ultra-peripheral or island regions, where 
otherwise inhabitants would suffer from severe disadvantages (e.g. unavailability of medical services or access to 
education institutions). Thus, the most obvious application of the PSO instrument can be observed in regions like the 
Canary Islands, Azores, Shetland Islands or Hebrides. The majority of currently applied PSOs fulfil these criteria 
(EC, 2017a). 
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Currently, the European Commission reports that 178 intra-EU PSOs are in place (EC, 2017a), of which 174 are 
domestic. As of April 2017, the only cross-border PSOs were Larnaca-Brussels (Ryanair, no compensation, open to 
competition), Strasbourg-Amsterdam (Air France), Strasbourg-Madrid (Air Nostrum), and Strasbourg-Prague 
(Czech Airlines). The latter three routes from Strasbourg were financially supported with 3.6 million € in 2013 and 
are closed to competition (Rocque, 2015).  
 
Another form of existing PSOs are air services between national capitals (Budapest to Pristina, Skopje, 
Podgorica, Sarajevo and Tirana) which have been imposed by the Hungarian government. These PSOs are not 
officially listed by the EC, as these routes are not intra-EU-routes. However, the Member State government 
(Hungarian government) pays a Community Carrier (Wizzair) to operate these services (Maslen, 2016).   
 
The application of PSOs to grant aid to LCCs is not a new phenomenon. Already in 2005, the Chambre de 
commerce et d'industrie du Var and the Aéroport Toulon-Hyères granted Ryanair an aid of 500,000 € per year to 
operate the air route from Toulon to London-Stansted. This state aid in the form of a compensation for a PSO was 
accepted by the EC without objections (EC, 2006).  
 
As a consequence of this, the authors find that the European Commission leaves a wide scope for the Member 
States to define air routes to be in general economic interest and hence be eligible to be designated as PSO. 
According to the EC Guidelines on SGEI, Member States are free to grant compensation up to the total cost of 
services plus a usual profit margin to an operator under the PSO regime (EC, 2012). 
 
Hence, the authors argue that in future, (regional) governments which want to avoid the closure of chronically 
loss-making airports could increasingly make use of the PSO instrument. This will be done not primarily to support 
a particular route of public interest, but to transfer funds to the airport in a legally compatible way. The financial 
flow from the government body to the airport can be shown as in figure 3.  
 
We assume that the instruments of PSOs can be (mis-)used to circumvent the future ban of operational aid to 
regional airports under the following conditions: A state institution (state, regional or even city government) wants 
to support a regional airport located in its region, which is not able to cover its operational costs. The state institution 
defines one or more air routes of their liking as being in the public interest. The state institution invites airlines for a 
tender, providing operating support at a fixed amount per passenger, e.g. for a daily flight to one or more 
destinations. The non-discriminatory, open and transparent tender may result in an offer that the winning airline 
requires a compensation of, e.g. 10 € per passenger on the routes defined as being in the public interest. The winning 
airline will pay airport charges for PSO flights at a level sufficient that the airport can cover its operating costs.  
 
With this set-up, the government body also avoids criticism of European Commission ―to maintain airport 
charges at an artificially low level in order to attract airlines and may thus significantly distort competition.‖ (EC, 
2014), as airport charges are sufficiently high to cover the airport’s operational cost.  
 
The presented indirect form of state aid to airports seems to be in line with European law, as the EC has set very 
narrow rules to designate an airport itself as SGEI: ―can only be the case if part of the area potentially served by the 
airport would, without the airport, be isolated from the rest of the Union to an extent that would prejudice its social 
and economic development.‖ (EC, 2014b). These criteria seem to be applicable only to most remote or island 
airports, but most likely not for regional airports e.g. in the periphery of metropolitan areas. 
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Fig. 3. Financial flow between public authority and airport operator under a PSO scheme, Source: own figure 
 
In summary, the legal hurdles to designate particular (or in the most extreme case – all) air routes at an airport are 
much lower, given the past examples of international PSOs being designated by Cyprus, France and Hungary. 
However, a massive use of the PSO instrument would significantly increase bureaucracy. Also, Article 19 (9) of the 
Air Services Regulation 1008/2008 limited PSO’s on a given route to a maximum of 4 years (or 5 years for routes to 
outermost regions). 
4.3. Publicly funded incentive schemes to air operators 
Within the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), numerous government bodies pay incentives to air 
operators in order to encourage passenger traffic (on the motivation behind see e.g. Núñez-Sánchez 2015). Incentive 
schemes as such are not critical, as long as they are designed as non-discriminatory, declining and with an absolute 
time limit. Examples for relatively high incentive payments include the schemes applied in Macedonia and Israel.  
 
The Macedonian incentive scheme, providing a lump sum of 40,000 € for each new destination and 11-13 € per 
passenger, deserves special attention. It includes the condition that any airline wanting to benefit from the scheme 
must have a profit of more than 25 million € and must have carried more than 10 million passengers. This 
effectively excludes without any good reason the majority of airlines and could hence not be considered as non-
discriminatory. One of the most attractive incentive schemes for airlines is offered by the Israeli Ministry of 
Tourism. Since 2015, an incentive payment of 45 € per passenger is offered for any passenger flying to the  airport of 
Eilat/Ovda during the winter months.  
 
Even as a non-discriminatory version of such an incentive scheme, distortions are likely to occur, as airports and 
countries are systematically at a disadvantage if they do not have such a scheme in place over countries that pay 
incentives to airlines, given that in the pan-European LCCs can easily shift aircraft from one region to a completely 
unrelated other region if incentive payments are granted. 
 
In sum, it remains questionable whether such incentive payments paid for by other branches of government (e.g. 
tourism or economic ministries) not directly related to airport operators or the transport ministry are legally 
compatible with an approach of the EC that aims to avoid competitive distortions in the European airport market.   
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5. Conclusion and Scope for future research 
With its Guidelines on state aid to airports and airlines published in 2014, the European Commission (EC) 
intended to regulate investment and operating aid to loss-making airports and regulate start-up aid to airlines, which 
could distort competition within the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) While the general notion of the 
Guidelines is reasonable, their effectiveness is doubtful, given the findings in this paper. The study investigated 
different areas on subsidies, which still could be paid either directly or indirectly to the airport operator.  
 
First, the classification of key airport functions as terminal air traffic management, firefighting and security as to 
be of non-economic nature allows a direct subsidy of key cost areas. Second, the paper found an indirect form of 
airport subsidy, namely when a public authority designates air routes to the airport to be Public Service Obligations 
(PSOs). Through the wide scope of freedom to define which routes are in the general economic interest, this 
instrument might be used in future to stimulate air traffic and support concerned airports. Case studies show that the 
PSO instrument has been used to support low cost carriers and probable also airports as indirect beneficiaries. The 
examples encompass Ryanair’s routes from Toulon to London Stansted (2005) and Wizzair’s routes from Budapest 
to five capitals in the Balkans (2016). Third, we have discussed the area of government-driven incentive schemes, 
which could be considered as state aid as defined by Guidelines. A problem arises in this area concerning the 
application of European law within the ECAA: While many countries at the periphery of the EU have joined the 
ECAA, which creates a common aviation market, it remains doubtful, whether the strict rules on state aid can and 
will be enforced. This field encompasses for instance large-scale incentive schemes in place at the airports of Skopje 
in Macedonia or Eilat/Ovda in Israel. As a consequence, we argue that competitive distortions in the area of state aid 
to airlines and airports will continue even after the end of the transitional period in 2024. As long as government 
bodies are willing to subsidize aviation, it is likely that the ban of state aid to loss-making regional airports will not 
have significant impact on the European airport landscape. 
 
This paper leaves considerable scope for future research: First, except for the few cases reported, we have not yet 
empirically assessed the actual use of different options for state-aid. Second, this paper does not assess if, and to 
what extent, measures to meet the new state aid guideline have had impact on the cost and/or revenue structure of 
(selected) airports. Subject to data availability (to our best knowledge, detailed airport cost and revenue data for 
European airports are not disclosed in a systematic way)†, such work could be undertaken in future research. Finally, 
further research effort should be undertaken to find answers to the general question to what extent state aid to the 
aviation industry is needed to correct market failures and/or to stimulate economic development on the one hand or 
distorts intra- and intermodal competition on the other hand. This would also require finding answers on the 
questions how many (regional) airports are needed from a welfare economics perspective, how their geographical 
distribution should look like and whether public bodies should provide funding to regional airports in areas where 
larger airports can be reached in a reasonable travel time. Only when these questions are reliably answered, effective 
regulations on state aid in this sector can be put into place, avoiding unintended loopholes and a waste of taxpayers’ 
money. 
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5. Conclusion and Scope for future research 
With its Guidelines on state aid to airports and airlines published in 2014, the European Commission (EC) 
intended to regulate investment and operating aid to loss-making airports and regulate start-up aid to airlines, which 
could distort competition within the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) While the general notion of the 
Guidelines is reasonable, their effectiveness is doubtful, given the findings in this paper. The study investigated 
different areas on subsidies, which still could be paid either directly or indirectly to the airport operator.  
 
First, the classification of key airport functions as terminal air traffic management, firefighting and security as to 
be of non-economic nature allows a direct subsidy of key cost areas. Second, the paper found an indirect form of 
airport subsidy, namely when a public authority designates air routes to the airport to be Public Service Obligations 
(PSOs). Through the wide scope of freedom to define which routes are in the general economic interest, this 
instrument might be used in future to stimulate air traffic and support concerned airports. Case studies show that the 
PSO instrument has been used to support low cost carriers and probable also airports as indirect beneficiaries. The 
examples encompass Ryanair’s routes from Toulon to London Stansted (2005) and Wizzair’s routes from Budapest 
to five capitals in the Balkans (2016). Third, we have discussed the area of government-driven incentive schemes, 
which could be considered as state aid as defined by Guidelines. A problem arises in this area concerning the 
application of European law within the ECAA: While many countries at the periphery of the EU have joined the 
ECAA, which creates a common aviation market, it remains doubtful, whether the strict rules on state aid can and 
will be enforced. This field encompasses for instance large-scale incentive schemes in place at the airports of Skopje 
in Macedonia or Eilat/Ovda in Israel. As a consequence, we argue that competitive distortions in the area of state aid 
to airlines and airports will continue even after the end of the transitional period in 2024. As long as government 
bodies are willing to subsidize aviation, it is likely that the ban of state aid to loss-making regional airports will not 
have significant impact on the European airport landscape. 
 
This paper leaves considerable scope for future research: First, except for the few cases reported, we have not yet 
empirically assessed the actual use of different options for state-aid. Second, this paper does not assess if, and to 
what extent, measures to meet the new state aid guideline have had impact on the cost and/or revenue structure of 
(selected) airports. Subject to data availability (to our best knowledge, detailed airport cost and revenue data for 
European airports are not disclosed in a systematic way)†, such work could be undertaken in future research. Finally, 
further research effort should be undertaken to find answers to the general question to what extent state aid to the 
aviation industry is needed to correct market failures and/or to stimulate economic development on the one hand or 
distorts intra- and intermodal competition on the other hand. This would also require finding answers on the 
questions how many (regional) airports are needed from a welfare economics perspective, how their geographical 
distribution should look like and whether public bodies should provide funding to regional airports in areas where 
larger airports can be reached in a reasonable travel time. Only when these questions are reliably answered, effective 
regulations on state aid in this sector can be put into place, avoiding unintended loopholes and a waste of taxpayers’ 
money. 
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